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ZLWKDV\PPHWULF LPSDWLHQFH7KHUHVXOWFDQEHFRQWULEXWHG WRVXJJHVW WKH
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QHJRWLDWLRQQRUPDOO\XVHGE\WZRSDUWLHV LQPRVWFDVH LVYHU\ LQWHUHVWLQJ
EHFDXVHZHZLOO EH DEOH WR ILQG WKH VSHFLILF VFLHQWLILFEHKDYLRU LQ WKLV
QHJRWLDWLRQSURFHVV7KHSXUSRVHRI WKLVSDSHU LV WRSURSRVHDIUHLJKW UDWH
ZKLFKZLOOEHLQFOXVLYHRIWKHGHOD\ORVVFRVWSHUGD\IRUERWKWKHFKDUWHUHU
DQGWKHVKLSRZQHU7KLVPHWKRGXVHV1DVKHTXLOLEULXPWKHRU\ZKLFKUHGXFHV
WKH ORVVFRVWRI WLPHDVZHOODVJLYHVD UHDVRQDEOHFRQWUDFW IRUERWK WKH
FKDUWHUHUDQGWKHVKLSRZQHU LQYR\DJHFKDUWHU7KHIDFWRUIRUGHWHUPLQLQJ



















VKRXOGEHFRPSDUHGDQGFRQWUDFWHGZLWK  WKH VFLHQWLILFPHWKRG WKDW LV
QHJRWLDWLRQZLWKHTXLOLEULXPIUHLJKW7KLVUHVHDUFKORRNVDWDQGFRYHUV WKH
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RZQHUFDQVWUDWHJLFDOO\RIIHUKLVKHUVXSSO\FXUYH WKDW LVJUHDWHU WKDQ WKH
PDUJLQDOFRVWFXUYHDQGHDFKREMHFWLYH IXQFWLRQ LV WKHTXDQWLOHRI WKH
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EHWZHHQRQH VHOOHUDQGRQHEX\HURU WZRPRUHEX\HUV LQIOXHQFHPDUNHW













SUDFWLFH LQRUGHU WR ILQG WKH IHDVLELOLW\RI5XELQVWHLQ WKHRU\ LQFKDUWHULQJ
VKLSSLQJ




PDQVD\EHFDXVHVKH LVPRUH LPSDWLHQW WRUHFHLYH WKH LQFRPHWKDQKH LV
WR UHFHLYHKHUVHUYLFH ,QSDUWLFXODU VXSSRVHGHOD\ UHGXFHVVHOOHU¶VJDLQV
IURPWUDGHE\EXWUHGXFHVEX\HU¶VE\RQO\,QWKLVFDVHWKHSOD\HUV
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5RXQG1XPEHU 2IIHU0DNHU 6HOOHU¶V6KDUH %X\HU¶V6KDUH
 6HOOHU  
 %X\HU  
 6HOOHU  
 %X\HU  
 6HOOHU  
ā ā ā ā
ā ā ā ā
 ā ā ā
 6HOOHU  
3 %X\HU  
2 6HOOHU  
1 %X\HU  
+6FRWW%LHUPDQ	/XLV)HUQDQGH]SS
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)LJXUH!7KH¿UVWWKUHHVXEJDPHVRI5XELQVWHLQ¶VDOWHUQDWLQJ
 RIIHUEDUJDLQLQJJDPH
(DFKRI WKHSUHYLRXVH[DPSOHVDVVXPHG WKDW WKHQXPEHURI URXQGVZDV
IL[HG ,QPRVWEDUJDLQLQJFLUFXPVWDQFHV WKRXJK WKHQXPEHURIURXQGVRI
RIIHUVDQGFRXQWHURIIHUV LVHVVHQWLDOO\XQERXQGHG$Q LPSRUWDQW UHVXOW LQ
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IV. The Equilibrium Charterage
6KLSRZQHUDQG&KDUWHUHUQHJRWLDWHZLWKDV\PPHWULF LPSDWLHQFH7KH


























UDWLR& FDUJRFRVW4 TXDQWLW\IRU ORDGLQJ7KHUHVHDUFKHUFKRRVHVWKH
ODWHVWFRDOSULFHVRXUFHGIURPLQGH[PXQGLFRPEDVHGRQ2FWREHU
 IRUFDOFXODWLQJGLVFRXQW IDFWRURIFKDUWHUHU , LVEDQN LQWHUHVW
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SHU WRQSHUGD\ LVGLYLGHGE\ WKHVXUSOXVRI WKH UHVXOW LVFDOFXODWHGDV
DQGFKDUWHUHU
VGLVFRXQWIDFWRULVFDOFXODWHGZKLFK
LVFDOOHGįF$FFRUGLQJ WR5XELQVWHLQ IRUPXOD WKHFKDUWHUHU¶V IUDFWLRQRI
VXUSOXVįVįVįF LVFDOFXODWHGDV$VWKHVXUSOXVLV86
FKDUWHUHU¶VVXUSOXVSD\RIILVGUDZQDV
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2. The Case Study : Ore
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DV  DQG VKLSRZQHU¶V VXUSOXV SD\RII LV FDOFXODWHG DV86
(TXLOLEULXPFKDUWHUDJHLV¿[HGDV86RIERWK
FKDUWHUHUDQGVKLSRZQHU











&KDUWHUHU 6KLSRZQHU &KDUWHUHU 6KLSRZQHU 0DUNHWSULFH
(TXLOLEULXP
SULFH
&RDO      
2UH      
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1. The Summary of Research
7KLVVWXG\DLPVDW ILQGLQJ WKHHTXLOLEULXPSULFHZLWK WKHFRQVLGHUDWLRQ
RI WKHGHOD\FRVWRQ WKHVLGHRIERWK WKHFKDUWHUHUDQG WKHVKLSRZQHU LQ
VSRWPDUNHW7KHHTXLOLEULXPLVFDOFXODWHGIURPWKHVXUSOXVRI5XELQVWHLQ¶V
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FKDUWHUDJH WKDWXVHV WKHVXUSOXV LQEDUJDLQLQJZLWKDV\PPHWULFSDWLHQFH


















DYHUDJHORVVSHU WRQDQGSHUGD\WREH867KLV LV WKHGLIIHUHQFHRI WKH
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.RUHD XQGHU WKH ,75&,QIRUPDWLRQ 7HFKQRORJ\ 5HVHDUFK &HQWHU VXSSRUW





The Charter Fixing Negotiation Procedure with Asymmetric Impatience 
in a Game Theory Framework: Case Studies in Coal and Ore Transactions
References
.2,&+,527H]XND	 ,6+,,0DVDKLUR ³6WUDWHJLF EHKDYLRU DQG WKH
GHWHUPLQDWLRQRIVSRWSULFHVLQVKLSSLQJIUHLJKWPDUNHWV$JDPHWKHRUHWLFDODSSURDFK´
,$0(&RQIHUHQFH3URFHHGLQJV'DOLDQ
&25721/DUV	 ,+5(5ROI	6$1'(9$51$UQHShip Broking and 
Chartering Practice//3/LPLWHG5HIHUHQFH3XEOLVKLQJ'LYLVLRQ
6723)25'0DUWLQMaritime Economics3XEOLVKHU5RXWOHGJH8.
*$5',1(51LJHOShip Operating Costs Annual Review and Forecast-2007/08
'UHZU\SXEOLFDWLRQV'UHZU\6KLSSLQJ&RQVXOWDQV/WG
%,(50$1+6FRWW	)(51$1'(=/XLVGame theory with economic 
applicationsQGHGLWLRQ$GGLVRQ:HVOH\3XEOLVKLQJFRPSDQ\,QF
&$6217LPRWK\1	 5(<12/'66WDOH\6 ³%RXQGHG5DWLRQDOLW\ LQ
/DERUDWRU\%DUJDLQLQJZLWKDV\PPHWULF,QIRUPDWLRQ´(FRQRPLF7KHRU\9ROSS

,QFKHRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOSRUWFRUSRUDWLRQKWWSZZZLFSDRUNULQIRIHHLQIRMVS
,QGH[PXQGLFRPKWWSZZZLQGH[PXQGLFRPFRPPRGLWLHV"FRPPRGLW\ FRDO
DXVWUDOLDQ	PRQWKV 
6WHHORQWKHQHWFRPKWWSZZZVWHHORQWKHQHWFRPFRPPRGLW\BSULFHVKWPO
